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ABSTRACT
AnNotify is a scalable service for private, timely and low-cost on-
line notifications, based on anonymous communication, sharding,
dummy queries, and Bloom filters. We present the design and anal-
ysis of AnNotify, as well as an evaluation of its costs. We outline
the design of AnNotify and calculate the concrete advantage of
an adversary observing multiple queries. We present a number of
extensions, such as generic presence and broadcast notifications,
and applications, including notifications for incoming messages in
anonymous communications, updates to private cached web and
Domain Name Service (DNS) queries.
1 INTRODUCTION
A number of on-line applications require timely notifications. Mail
delivery protocols notify users when a new email can be retrieved,
social networking and instant messaging applications send updates
of presence, and broadcast notifications carry updates of DNS or
cached web records. Traditionally, notification services provide no
privacy vis-à-vis the notification service itself, that can observe
the routing of notifications from the publisher of the event to the
subscriber. The fact, that particular consumers are subscribed to a
particular pubisher or larger groups of publishers can revel sensi-
tive private information about them. Thus, the privacy preserving
systems, such as anonymous communication systems [7], or private
presence systems [5], rely on private notifications: an adversary
should not be able to observe what events a user subscribes to.
In this paper we present AnNotify, a private notification service,
leveraging an anonymous communication system, based on simple
cryptographic constructions. The AnNotify system is designed for
efficiency. Subscribers only retrieve small parts of the event data-
base, to which we refer to as shards. Simple and fast cryptographic
techniques, allow AnNotify to scale well, while providing rigorous
privacy guarantees.
AnNotify has numerous applications. Some only require pri-
vate notification to signal availability of a service or a peer (e.g.,
in instant-messaging systems), or events such as alerts. Other ap-
plications, e.g., blacklists, require public notifications with multi-
ple subscribers. Broadcast notifications may signal when a cached
value changes; this is especially important for privacy-preserving
storage mechanisms such as Oblivious RAM [21, 33] and PIR [8],
where each access involves significant overhead. Beyond these, the
broadcast notifications can improve the privacy of web and DNS
caches, and significantly improve the performance of such caches
when they are queried over anonymizing networks such as Tor;
see [16, 25, 32].
Contributions: This paper makes the following contributions:
• We introduce AnNotify, a new private and scalable notification
system, which guarantees relationship privacy at a low band-
width and performance cost.
• We present a security definition for AnNotify which allows for
some leakage, to flexibly accommodate efficient systems. We
also present a rigid proof of AnNotify security, delivering an
upper bound of the information leakage, which can be applied
to systems which security is based on sharding.
• We present an implementation of AnNotify as a web-server,
which can be scaled to millions of clients at a lower cost than
alternatives such as DP5 which we also evaluate.
2 MODEL AND GOALS
AnNotify is a service connecting notification publisherswith specific
notification subscribers that query for notifications. We describe the
system for a single subscriber per notification first and extend it
later to broadcast to multiple subscribers.
The AnNotify system consists of multiple shards that are man-
aged by a single untrusted server. Shards store information about
the presence of the notifications uploaded by the publishers, which
subscribers can then query from the system. AnNotify operates
in epochs. Each epoch publishers, who want to notify the sub-
scriber, connect directly to the system to upload the notifications,
whereas the subscribers, in order to subscribe or query for notifica-
tions, connect with the servers through the anonymous channels,
as illustrated in Figure 1. AnNotify uses anonymous channels for
communications, and leverages them to increase the efficiency of
private queries from a database of notifications. We consider these
channels to be perfect, namely to hide all meta-data about senders
and receivers of messages, and also the length of messages, as would
be expected from a robust mix-network [7].
Security Goals. The AnNotify system provides a number of pri-
vacy properties:
Subscriber privacy. Third parties, including the notifier and
the infrastructure, cannot tell whether a subscriber sought a
notification from a particular publisher.
Epoch unlinkability. An adversary cannot tell whether queries
across epochs were initiated by the same subscriber or concern
the same notification.
Broadcast privacy. Whenmultiple subscribers are authorized
to receive the same notification, corrupt subscribers cannot dis-
cover that other honest subscribers are subscribed to the same
notification as they are.
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Figure 1: The AnNotify architecture.
Threat Model. The AnNotify design assumes a global passive
adversary, who may observe any part or the whole network and
tries to infer the relationships between publishers and subscribers.
All servers that manage shards may be malicious and work with
the adversary.
Moreover, AnNotify considers that a fraction of users are mali-
cious: they collude with the eavesdropping adversary, servers or
other users to try to break the privacy properties of the system or
reveal some information about other users. However, we assume
that a large number of concurrent AnNotify users (publishers and
subscribers) are honest, and follow the protocol faithfully. We also
assume, that the adversary has a partial knowledge about the rela-
tionships among publishers and subscribers , and that the adversary
may chose to some extent which honest users participate in the
protocols at different times. We justify those assumptions further
in the paper.
All communications among the requesting subscribers and the
servers go through an anonymity network [7, 10, 28]. We assume
that this system is immune to traffic analysis. Namely, from the
point of view of the adversary, it provides a perfect secret permuta-
tion between its input and output messages.
3 THE DESIGN OF ANNOTIFY
In this section, we present the detailed description of AnNotify.
We first start with sketching the straw-man design based on triv-
ial Private Information Retrieval (PIR), and argue informally for
its security but also its inefficiency. We then present the detailed
description of AnNotify.
Straw-man Design. A single server acts as the infrastructure for
storing notifications. Publishers and subscribers privately agree on
a secret random identifier for a specific notification event. When
a publisher wishes to send a notification, she transmits the pre-
arranged random identifier to the server which stores it forever.
Subscribers of notifications access the single server, and periodically
download the full database of stored notification identifiers, looking
for identifiers they recognise as events. This naïve design is secure:
since subscribers always download the full database, an adversary
at the server cannot distinguish the notification they seek. However,
performance is poor: since the database grows continuously, and
downloading the full database becomes very expensive. Even using
procedure
N .GenSystem(n, S, κ, ∆)
Choose packet length l
for i = 0, . . . , S − 1 do
s0i ← []
end for
▷ σ is the state of the system
σ ← {s00, s01, . . . s0S−1 }
π ← {n, S, κ }
return σ , l, π
end procedure
procedure N .GenChannel(π )
ck
R←− {0, 1}κ
return ck
end procedure
procedure N .Notify(cki , t )
µ ← PRFcki (t )
return (i , µ )
end procedure
procedure N .ProcNotify(µ, t, σ )
i ← µ mod π .S
if s ti not in σ then
s ti ← []
σ ′ ← σ ∪ {s ti }
end if
Add string µ to Bloom filter s ti
return σ ′
end procedure
procedure N .Query(cki , t, π )
µ ← PRFcki (t )
ϕ ← µ mod π .S
ϕ′ $← {0, . . . , π .S }
return {ϕ, ϕ′ }
end procedure
procedure
N .ProcQuery(ϕ, t, σ , sk )
ρ ← (ϕ, s tϕ from σ )
return ρ
end procedure
procedure
N .ProcResponse(ρ, ck, t )
µ ← PRFck (t )
ϕ ← µ mod π .S
ϕ′′, s ← ρ
if µ in s and ϕ = ϕ′′ then
return True
else
return False
end if
end procedure
Figure 2: The concrete instantiation of all algorithms of AnNotify.
PIR [8], for more efficient private download causes a scalability
bottleneck and has performance limitations, as the DP5 presence
service [5] illustrates (more in Section 6.2). AnNotify provides an
efficient and scalable solution to this problem, at the cost of some
privacy leakage, which we evaluate carefully.
3.1 The AnNotify Protocols
Figure 2 presents the concrete algorithms of AnNotify, which we
discuss informally below.
Setup.We consider a population of n users, distinguished as pub-
lishers and subscribers, using the AnNotify system to exchange
notifications. We denote S as the number of shards used by AnNo-
tify for sharing notifications, and each shard is denoted as si , i ∈
{0, . . . , S −1}. To increase the capacity and scalability of the system,
the shards can be distributed among multiple untrusted servers,
however, the number of servers does not impact security. Thus, we
consider a single untrusted server managing all shards.
AnNotify uses Bloom filters [3], an efficient data structure used
for representing set membership, in order to compress the repre-
sentation of the shards. We note that Bloom filters are not used in
AnNotify as privacy mechanism, and could be replaced by any other
(succinct or not) data representation. As N .GenSystem(n, S,κ,∆)
we denote the system setup procedure, ran by the server to initialize
all parameters of the system, where κ ∈ 1∗, ∆ > 0 are the security
parameters.
A publisher who wishes to send a notification to a subscriber,
simply provides themwith a secret channel key (ck) – either directly
or derived through a public key cryptographic scheme. We denote
the channel establishing procedure asN .GenChannel(π ), where π
is the public information.
For publishing and querying notifications clients use a crypto-
graphic Pseudo-Random Function (PRF : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗)
that is indistinguishable from a true random function to a compu-
tationally bound adversary not knowing the secret key [23]. The
AnNotify system operates in sequential epochs, like Apres [24],
denoted by t for time. For simplicity we assume that the length of
all notifications, queries and responses, is always a fixed value l .
Publishing notifications. To publish a notification the publisher
runs N .Notify which derives an epoch specific notification iden-
tifier IDtck for a particular event using a PRF. For each single no-
tification the publisher computes the event notification identifier
for epoch t using the shared channel key ck as IDtck = PRFck (t ).
The publisher then computes the index of shard si in which the
notification should be stored as i ← IDtck mod S . Finally, the pub-
lisher sends IDtck directly to the server managing shard si . This
process spreads different notifications across shards. The server
may optionally perform some authentication and authorization of
publishers before accepting to store the notification. Our scheme
does not impede this, but details around authenticity are outside
the scope of this work.
Storing notifications. The server manages a set of shards, mod-
eled as Bloom filters, for a given time epoch t . Upon receiving a
notification IDtck at epoch t server runs procedure N .ProcNotify,
which adds the notification to a Bloom filter Bi,t [18] for shard si ,
which includes all received notifications for a particular epoch. The
server makes all shards available for download in the next epoch.
Querying for notifications.To check for notifications, subscribers
repeatedly poll, in every epoch, the server for notifications by down-
loading the shards of interest via an anonymous network. At the
beginning of epoch t + 1 each subscriber reconstructs the epoch
event identifier IDtck for the notifications they wish to check for
the previous period t by computing IDtck = PRFck (t ). Next, they
recompute the shard identifier i ← IDtck mod S , in which IDtck
might be stored. We denote this querying procedure as N .Query.
Alongside the query for the ‘real’ shard of interest each honest user
anonymously sends a ‘dummy’ indistinguishable and unlinkable
query to a random shard. These dummies ensure that no matter
what side information is available to the adversary, each honest
user contributes some uncertainty to the pattern of queries for the
epoch. The notification service runs next theN .ProcQuery in order
to process the received queries and returns the obtained results to
the subscribers. Each subscriber then anonymously, through a mix
network, downloads the Bloom filter Bi,t for shard si .
Processing the reponse. Upon receiving a response from the
server, the subscriber triggers the procedureN .ProcResponse(ρ, ck, t ),
which checks whether IDtck is present in the filter or not. This pro-
cedure may yield a false positive match, misleading the subscriber
into thinking that a particular notification was present when it
was not. However, selecting proper Bloom filter parameters rela-
tive to the number of notifications allows us to minimize the error
probability [6].
4 SECURITY OF ANNOTIFY
In this section, we first discuss an Indistinguishable-Notification
Experiment, a challenge game between an adversary and the sys-
tem, which we use to measure the security. Next, we construe the
security definition resulting from it, to quantify the privacy prop-
erties guaranteed by the notification systems. Finally, we present
the main security theorem of our system and the degree of security
obtained for concrete parameters.
4.1 Game between the adversary and the
AnNotify system
In this section, we describe an Indistinguishable-Notification Experi-
ment (IndNotExp), defined in details in Figure 7 in appendix A.1,
addressing the threats identified in section 2. In this experiment, the
adversaryA observes the system over many epochs. There exists a
target subscriber, that may be subscribed to one of two publishers (A
or B) that are controlled by the adversary. The goal of the adversary
is to infer to which publisher a target user is subscribed.
At the beginning of time, the experiment flips a bit b at random,
and decides which of the two publishers the target subscriber sub-
scribes to. Over multiple epochs the adversary schedules multiple
notifications and queries to be executed, and has a full control over
which honest publishers notify and which honest subscribers query
for their respective notifications. We assume, that at least u honest
subscribers query every epoch. A observes the query patterns of
the subscribers, including the target subscriber requesting the target
notifications, possibly over multiple epochs, and tries to guess b.
The threat model captured by the Indisitinguishable-Notification
Experiment is very generous to the adversary: A has a full visibil-
ity into the processing of all notifications and all query requests
at all shards of the system for as many epochs as they wish. The
adversary is also assumed to know the relationship between all
honest publishers-subscriber pairs1 and is given the secrets associ-
ated with the notifications of the two potential target notifications
–modelling corrupt notifiers or other subscribers in a broadcast
group. Figure 7 in Appendix illustrates the detailed IndNotExp
experiment as a game in which the adversary controls, for a num-
ber of epochs, notifications (A (i, t , ‘notify?’) = 1) and queries
(A (t ,u, ‘GetSubscribers?’)) from users. The adversary is given
all the above information including the challenge notification keys
ckA and ckB (through invocations to A (·)). In r rounds, the adver-
sary may chose to trigger the target subscriber to query by setting
A (t , ‘TargetQuery?’) to 1. Finally, the adversary tries to guess a
challenge bit b with A (‘Guess?′), i.e., tries to decide which target
notification was queried by the target subscriber in the protocol
run with full knowledge of the secrets it shares with notifiers. The
game returns 1 if the adversary guessed correctly.
Based on the presented challenge experiment we now define a
∆−private notification system.
Definition 4.1. A notification system N is (u,n,∆)-private if for
any PPT adversary A holds:
Pr [IndNotExp(N ,A,n, S,κ,∆,u) = 1] ≤ 12 + ∆ + negl(κ)
1It is inevitable to model a private notification system that leaks information. Since
the adversary may observe the system for a polynomial number of past epochs she
may learn all other mappings except the challenge one.
The probability is taken over all coin tosses, including uniform
choice of bit b, and where negl(·) is a negligible function; the in-
equality should hold for sufficiently large security parameter κ
and depends on the number of epochs r the target subscriber was
activated to query. For simplicity, we call such a system ∆-private.
Intuitively, ∆ defines the advantage of the adversary, in successfully
guessing which notification the target subscriber repeatedly queried,
over a random guess. If the adversary would be guessing randomly,
she has a 50% chances of a correct guess. Thus, ∆ quantifies how
much additional information the observed system leaks to A.
This definition ensures that AnNotify provides privacy even
when the adversary knows the shared key – allowing notification
privacy even when the notifier or another subscriber in a broadcast
group, is dishonest and working with the adversary.
4.2 The Security of AnNotify
In this section, we present the security theorem showing An-
Notify to be a secure ∆-private notification system, as defined in
Definition 4.1 (Section 4.1). We highlight, that the presented secu-
rity theorem is very general, thus is not limited to the AnNotify
system but also can be applied to other systems, which distribute
the information among many entities and base there security prop-
erties on an set of honest participants. Examples of such systems
are presented in section 7.
We recall, that S denotes the number of shards, u denotes the
minimum number of honest subscribers querying in every epoch
and r denotes the number of epochs the adversary observes the
target subscriber querying for a notification.
In order to quantify the security properties of AnNotify, we
want to compute the advantage of the adversary in winning the
IndNotExp game, thus the chances to break the privacy of a target
subscriber. We start by proving a differentially private [13] secu-
rity bound ϵ for the privacy loss in IndNotExp, where the target
subscriber only sends a single query.
Let us first define the following notation
Definition 4.2. Let
A = {(xA,xB ) : Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB |IA]
≤ eϵ Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB |IB ]}
We say that Pr[XA,XB |IA] ≤ eϵ Pr[XA,XB |IB ] holds for ϵ > 0 with
probability at least 1 − δ to mean that Pr[(XA,XB ) ∈ A] ≥ 1 − δ .
In the following lemma, we quantify all the possible scenarios
in which the queries sent by the subscribers are distributed among
shards in such a way, that the adversary can easily link the target
subscriber to the notification.
Lemma 4.3. Let XA, XB denote the query volumes observed by the
adversary at shards sA, sB in a single round assuming that queries
map to shards following uniform multinomial distribution, and let
IA, IB define events when a particular challenge notification is queried
in the final round. An (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy bound by which:
Pr[XA,XB |IA] ≤ eϵ Pr[XA,XB |IB ]
holds for ϵ > 0 with probability at least 1 − δ , where
δ ≤ exp
(
− (u − 1)4S
)
+ exp
(
− (u − 1)2S tanh
2
(ϵ
2
))
. (1)
The probabilities are taken over all coin flips of honest notification
not observed by the adversary.
Proof. For proof see appendix B.
Intuitively, in the presented lemma ϵ is a measure of a flexible
leakage, and δ sums up the probabilities of scenarios in which the
adversary is easily winning the challenge game.
Since we know how to quantify δ , we need additionally to com-
pute the amount of leakage due to ϵ . To derive the adversary advan-
tage for r observed queries we use a generic composition theorem.
In the following lemma we derive an overall bound of adversary’s
advantage, in guessing to whom the target user subscribes, after
r rounds when the adversary sees the target subscriber querying
for the notification. As Sb=0, Sb=1 we denote the events that the
subscriber queries a particular shard, where the target notification
was uploaded. As Oi = (X iA,X
i
B ) we denote the observation of the
number of queries observed coming to shard sA and sB respectively
in round i .
Lemma 4.4. Let Oi be an (ϵ,δ )-differentially private observa-
tion in round i , on two private inputs Sb=0 and Sb=1, for which
Pr[Oi |Sb=0] ≤ eϵ Pr[Oi |Sb=1] with probability at least 1 − δ .
If the adversary A is provided with a set of observations over r
rounds denoted as O¯ = (O1, . . . ,Or ) resulting from either Sb=0 or
Sb=1, and tries to guess the input bit b, she succeeds with probability:
Pr
[
A (O¯, Sb=0, Sb=1) = b | O¯
]
≤ 12 +
1
2 tanh
( rϵ
2
)
+ rδ + negl(κ),
where A (O¯, Sb=0, Sb=1) denotes the guess of the adversary.
Proof. For proof see appendix B.
Based on the above lemmas we derive the security theorem,
proving that AnNotify is a ∆-private notification system.
Security Theorem 1. The AnNotify system is a ∆-private notifi-
cation system, for ∆ > 0 satisfying the following inequality. For any
ϵ > 0,
∆ ≤ 12 tanh
( rϵ
2
)
+ r exp
(
− (u − 1)4S
)
+ r exp
(
− (u − 1)2S tanh
2
(ϵ
2
))
Proof. The detailed proof is presented in Appendix A.1.
Security Theorem 1 presents a bound on ∆ that provides insight
about the adversary’s advantage based on the security parameters
of the system. The bound for ∆ depends proportionaly on the ratio
u−1
S and ϵ .
2 However, this bound is very loose. A tighter bound on
∆ is less elegant.
2Note, that the upper bound on δ in lemma 4.3 is constant as long as the ratio u−1S is
constant. In theorem 1, because δ depends on ϵ , we obtain a uniform bound for ∆ for
all values of δ , when ϵ is fixed.
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Figure 3: The empirical adversary’s advantage for a single round, av-
eraged over 106 samples, as a function of the number of subscribers
and the number of shards. The advantage is presented on a log
scale.
Lemma 4.5. The AnNotify system is a ∆-private notification system
for
∆ ≤ 12 tanh
( rϵ
2
)
+ rCDF
[
u − 1, 2
S
,C
]
+ r
u−1∑
i=C
CDF
[
i,
1
2 ,α
] (u − 1
i
) ( 2
S
)i (
1 − 2
S
)u−1−i
,
where ϵ > 0.
where CDF[n,p,x] is the cumulative distribution function for a
binomially distributed variable. We can compute this bound on ∆
using Monte-Carlo integration though importance sampling.
4.3 Empirical adversary advantage
Our security theorems bound the advantage ∆ of the adversary
through a number of upper bounds and a generic composition the-
orem. This upper bound is correct but extremely loose: it assumes
that in each round the worst possible observation will occur; it dis-
counts totally cases where the adversary observes too few queries
to target shards – even though they may hide information; and
takes a number of loose upper bounds to yield an insightful ex-
pression. To get a more accurate view of ∆ˆ, the advantage of the
adversary, we compute it empirically through sampling.
For fixed parameters u and S we draw a large number of samples
from a Multinomial(θ ,n) distribution with parameter vector θ =
[(s − 2)/s, 1/s, 1/s] and n = u − 1, each in effect simulating a single
observed epoch.We denote as x⃗A and x⃗B the sample values falling in
the second and third bucket respectively. Without loss of generality,
we assume that bucket A always gets at least one message. We first
compute an empirical δˆ as the fraction of values in x⃗B that are
zero, thus allowing the adversary to perfectly win the IndNotExp
experiment. Given the security parameters used in the evaluation
this condition is very rare and has never occurred. Next, we estimate
ϵˆ as the mean leakage the adversary observes for all samples with
positive x⃗B :
ϵˆ =
1
I
·
∑
i
log xA[i]
xB [i]
,
where I denotes the number of samples. This is the log of the
Geometric mean of the leakage for each epoch. From the Law of
Large numbers [17], we know that for a large number of repeated
experiments, the average of the results is close to the expected
value, and the more trials we run, the closer the expeted value we
are. Hence, the computed value of ϵˆ for a large number of samples
I quantifies the expected leakage of an observed round. The overall
advantage after r epochs can then be computed as:
∆ˆ = tanh(r ϵˆ/2)/2 + r δˆ
This empirical advantage is the mean advantage of the adversary
after observing a very large number of AnNotify epochs. And given
low leakage in every round it is a more accurate depiction of the
security of the system under multiple observations than the bound
from our theorems. Figure 3 depicts the empirically computed ad-
versarial advantage for a single round, over the AnNotify system
composed of 102, 103, 104 shards and a varying number of sub-
scribers querying for notifications.
Further in thework, we use the empirical evaluation to accurately
compare security and performance with DP5.
4.4 Other security arguments
Our main proof of security of AnNotify concerns the subscriber
privacy property, under a very strong threat model. We argue
informally in this section that other security properties also hold,
but defer their formal definition and proof to a longer version of
this work due to lack of space.
The Epoch Unlinkability property ensures that queries in dif-
ferent epochs cannot be linked with each other or a specific sub-
scriber. It is a simple result of the use of keyed pseudo-random
function to derive unlikable identifiers within each epoch.
The Broadcast Privacy property ensures that a malicious sub-
scriber, with knowledge of the notification key, is not not able
to determine whether another query (or subscriber) is querying
the same known notification. This property is implied by the very
strong IndNotExp definition and game. Since the adversary in this
game has knowledge of the notification shared key they are exactly
in the same position as another subscriber of the same notification,
and thus they both enjoy at most the same advantage.
5 ANALYTICAL PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
Bandwidth.We evaluate the bandwidth cost of multi-shard AnNo-
tify against the naïve design using a multi-server IT-PIR [8] scheme
inspired by DP5 [5]. Let the number of shards in AnNotify be S , and
the number of servers in the PIR scheme be S ′. Since in AnNotify all
shards are of equal size, denoted as l , the number of bits transferred
is nl ·mx where n is the number of subscribers that downloaded the
Bloom filter andmx is the cost of using a mix network to transport
data (to be fair we assumemx = S ′). For the IT-PIR scheme the cost
is nS ′√v , where v is the number of bits in the server’s database.
Additionally, since AnNotify may yield false positives, we must
consider the bandwidth cost of a subsequent action of a subscriber
given that they received a notification, which we denote as a. We
intentionally do not specify what this action is, as AnNotify could
be used in a variety of applications. Let k ≤ n be the number of
subscribers who received a notification and f be the error rate of
the Bloom filter. Then h = nf subscribers will incorrectly think
they have received a notification. Hence the cost of performing
actions in AnNotify is a(k +h), whereas in the PIR scheme the cost
is ak since no false positives occurs.
The total cost of AnNotify isnl ·mx +a(k+h) = nl ·mx +a(k+nf ).
The total cost of the PIR scheme is nS ′√v +ak . We want to estimate
the cutoff costa for AnNotify to be less expensive than a PIR scheme,
hence we require nl ·mx + a(k + nf ) < nS ′√v + ak . This gives
a <
S ′
√
v−(l ·mx )
f .
We note that the false positive rate f and the size of the Bloom
filter l are related by f ≈ (1/2)l log 2/m , wherem is the number of
messages in the filter, that we assume is approximately N /S where
N is the total number of notifications. Similarly, the database in an
IT-PIR system would need at least v = N logN bits to store a list
of up to N distinct notifications. Thus, it is preferable to use the
AnNotify system over IT-PIR when the cost of an action a is lower
than the following threshold: a < (S ′
√
N logN − (l ·mx ))2 lSN log 2.
Latency. In the AnNotify system, a notification sent by a publisher
in epoch ei becomes available to a subscriber in epoch ei+1. The
time between a notification being sent and when it can be read is
|e | + t , where t is the round trip time taken by the notification to be
routed through the mix network and |e | denotes the server epoch
length. Note, that this time t is dependent on the amount of traffic
passing through the mix network, and the mix networks flushing
mechanism.
Refresh rate, epoch length, cost and privacy.
In AnNotify system publishers and subscribers must decide on
an epoch length, based on which their notification identifiers will
change. There is a clear trade-off: shorter epochs mean shorter
waiting times but result in the subscribers requesting more often.
Publisher-subscriber epoch lengths are entirely context dependent,
for example a social network presence notification system will
likely have much shorter publisher-subscriber epoch lengths than
a storage system.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Three key advantages of AnNotify over previous works [5, 8] are
efficiency, extremely low infrastructure cost (even at large scale),
and ease of implementation. In this section, we describe a prototype
implementation of AnNotify, based on web technologies for the
server components, and Tor as an anonymity system. Next, we
compare it with DP5.
6.1 Implementation & Infrastructure
We implement AnNotify as a web-server that subscribers may easily
access through themost popular anonymity network today, Tor [12].
We note, that even though we use Tor, the anonymous channels
might be implemented using other design, for example [28]. We are
aware that Tor only provides anonymity properties against a local
or limited passive adversary, and thus the experimental system
inherits this limitation. Since we are concerned with performance
we focus on supporting as many clients as possible, and decreasing
the connection time between the client and the server.
Our implementation of AnNotify consists of two servers: a front-
end server with whom the clients communicate to download shards,
and a back-end server that maintains the Bloom filters. We design
AnNotify so that queries are served as requests for a static resource:
since those only need to retrieve the Bloom filter corresponding
to a previous epoch. The task of the front-end server is simply to
serve medium to large static resources; since servers are untrusted,
caching and content distribution network may be used to speed
this up – and this is a feature of AnNotify. We expect the size of the
Bloom filter served to be similar to the size of an image, between
several kilobytes to a few megabytes.
To perform a query and retrieve the Bloomfilter, AnNotify clients
just send an HTTP GET requests to the front-end server. To op-
tionally register a notification, the clients can additionally send the
notification identifier for the current epoch as a parameter to the
HTTP request. The front-end server immediately responds with
the relevant current Bloom filter, that is stored as a static file, and
forwards the request to the back-end server to update the next filter.
At the beginning of every epoch, the back-end server sends the
next Bloom filters, one for each shard, to the front-end server, and
the front-end server replaces the current Bloom filter with it.
We used Nginx3 for the front-end server due to its high perfor-
mance in serving static resources. We implemented the back-end
server in Java, relying on Netty4, a non-blocking I/O (NIO) client-
server framework. We relied on Google Guava’s implementation of
Bloom filter5. The front-end implementation simply consists of the
Nginx configuration file, and the back-end is 300 lines of Java code.
6.2 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate AnNotify, we run an AnNotify server on a single Win-
dows 7 OS, 8GB RAM machine. The back-end and the front-end
servers run as two processes. From another machine, we run our
client program from several processes to simulate 100K requests in
epochs of 5 minutes. We tested the system for shards from 10Kb
to 100Kb. Larger shards imply larger Bloom filters to retrieve and
higher bandwidth.
A single machine served 100K clients when the shard size was up
to 30Kb. For larger shards we encountered sporadic failures for some
clients, and had to add additional servers to handle some shards.
The design of AnNotify allows distributing the shards among sev-
eral machines without overhead. The yearly cost of an Amazon
EC2 m4.large instance (in April 2016), which is equivalent to the
machine we used, is $603. Dividing the cost of additional machine
by 100K clients implies minimal additional cost of less than a single
cent per client. Our measurements indicate an additional server is
required for each 30Kb increase of the shard size.
We estimated the cost of running AnNotify in the Amazon cloud.
The main factor in the cost calculation was the bandwidth that
increases linearly as a function of the shard size. However, the
bandwidth cost per byte decreases as the system consumes more
bandwidth, e.g., for larger shards and for more clients. Figure 4
3The NGINX Web Server https://www.nginx.com/
4The Netty Framework http://netty.io/
5Guava: Google Core Libraries for Java https://github.com/google/guava
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Figure 4: AnNotify’s implementation evaluation summary. The system scales perfectly for the increasing number of clients. Larger shards
imply higher bandwidth and cost per client. The cost evaluation was done based on Amazon EC2 m4.large instances.
illustrates our costs estimation, extrapolated from measurements
using our experimental setup, for a full year of operation in the
Amazon cloud. The costs are illustrated in monetary values, on the
basis of the cost of an Amazon EC2 m4.large instances. The results
show that AnNotify is indeed very efficient, and extremely cheap
to operate in the real world. Figure 4(a) shows that the yearly cost
per client ranges from a few cents (shards of 10Kb) to less than a
quarter (shards of 100Kb). Figure 4(b) shows the linear growth in
the yearly bandwidth used by AnNotify client as a function of a
shard size. However, as depicted by Figure 4(c), the AnNotify scales
perfectly in the number of clients, such that the cost per client even
decreases as there are more clients in the system. For a shard of size
10Kb, yearly costs per client is around 3 cents for both 100K and 1
milion users. In comparison, in DP5 the monthly cost per-user for
bandwidth is about 0.05 cent, which results in 60 cents per year for
100K users, and around 120 cents for 1 milion users.
6.3 Comparison to DP5
Compared to the thousands of lines of C++ and Python used to build
DP5 [5], AnNotify was significantly easier to implement and does
not require PIR services or Pairing-friendly libraries. Despite being
implemented in Java, it efficiently supports a hundred thousand
clients, and can be parallelized to scale to millions of clients easily
(see Figure 4(c)) with significantly lower yearly cost than DP5, of a
few cents per client.
Given the different threat models and functionality it is delicate
to provide a fair comparison between DP5 and AnNotify calibrated
in terms of security. To do so we compare the second phase of DP5,
with each user having a single friend, and the status communicated
being a single bit notification. Thus, for u users DP5 would have to
serve through PIR a database of at least u bits using IT-PIR over ℓ
servers, acting as the security parameter. We configure AnNotify to
also serve a database of u bits over S shards, using a mix network
with path length ℓ. Both ℓ and S < u are the security parameters
of AnNotify for a fixed number of users u. We do not use Bloom
filters to avoid making assumption on notification utilization, thus
presenting a very costly variant of AnNotify.
We consider that either IT-PIR servers or mix servers may be
corrupt with a fixed probability f . In that case the advantage of the
adversary in DP5 is f ℓ , namely the probability that all PIR servers
are corrupt. For AnNotify the advantage of the adversary is the
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Figure 5: Security versus Bandwidth comparison for AnNotify and
DP5/IT-PIR, for different parameters ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , 11} and S ∈
{103, . . . , 108 }. Database of u = 109 bits and users, and fraction of
corrupt nodes f = 10%. We observe that AnNotify is orders of mag-
nitude cheaper when some leakagemay be tolerated (adversary ad-
vantage e−5 . . . e−10). (Smaller is better on both axes.)
leakage ∆, that we compute empirically (to get a tight estimate, see
appendix 4.3), added to the probability f ℓ that all mix-servers are
corrupt.
Bandwidth. Figure 5 illustrates the trade-off between security and
bandwidth for AnNotify compared to DP5 using the above con-
figuration, for differing security parameters S (shards) and ℓ (mix
or PIR servers). We vary S ∈ {103, . . . , 108} and ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , 11}.
The measurements are for one billion notifications (u=109) and a
fraction f = 10% of corrupt servers. We observe that AnNotify
requires many orders of magnitude (log scale x axis) lower band-
width per query than DP5 for moderate adversary advantage (e.g.,
e−5 . . . e−11). This advantage is comparable to using ℓ ≤ 5 PIR
servers. For each value of S we observe that at first the advantage is
dominated by the probability of the mix network failing (for low ℓ)
before stabilizing and being dominated by the leakage of AnNotify.
Processing.We implement the DP5 second phase IT-PIR scheme
using 64 bit numpy matrix multiplication, to compare the CPU
costs of AnNotify versus DP5. We note that IT-PIR is CPU bound,
while the untrusted servers of AnNotify are purely network bound,
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Figure 6: Security versus CPU cost comparison for AnNotify and
DP5/IT-PIR, for different parameters ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , 11} and S ∈
{103, . . . , 108 }. Database of u = 109 bits and users, and fraction of
corrupt nodes f = 10%. We observe that AnNotify requires less pro-
cessing time than IT-PIR for comparable security levels. (Smaller is
better on both axes.)
since no processing takes place on them aside from serving static
shards of data. However, the anonymity network used by AnNotify
may become a CPU bottleneck. To estimate this cost we measured
the total CPU overhead per mix message using the Sphinx6 packet
format [10] for appropriate payload sizes and path lengths ℓ.
Figure 6 illustrates the total CPU costs for u = 109 queries
and f = 10% for both DP5/IT-PIR and AnNotify. We vary S ∈
{103, . . . , 108} and ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , 11}. We observe that for equivalent
security levels the CPU cost of mixing messages in AnNotify is
always orders of magnitude (log scale x axis) lower than the equiv-
alent CPU cost of processing IT-PIR queries in DP5.
7 ANNOTIFY EXTENSIONS
AnNotify as a presence system.AnNotify can be used as a privacy-
friendly presence system, to transmit a small amount of information
from the publisher to the subscriber. A presence system allows to
indicate an online presence of the users. For example, when a single
user connects to the network the presence system informs which
friends are online.
In this variant, each shard stores the received notifications as a
list within each shard, instead of Bloom filter. Two users who would
like to use AnNotify share a secret channel key ck . Alice wants to
notify Bob of message m on this channel. To do so, she computes
the value of a pseudo random function keyed with ck based on
the current time stamp as IDt = PRFck (t ) and the shard index
i = PRFck (t ) mod S . She then encrypts the selected message with
an Authenticated Encryption Scheme with Associated Data (AEAD)
(such as AES-GCM) with a secret key ck to obtain the ciphertext
ct = AEADck (ID
t ;m). In order to notify, Alice sends the tuple
(IDt , c) to the corresponding shard si based on IDt . The server
adds it to the stored values within that shard.
At the beginning of the next epoch, Bob queries the servers for
shard si and downloads the full set of values stored within it. To
check for the presence notifications, the subscriber searches in the
6Using the Python sphinxmix package.
list the tuple with the identifier PRFck (t ), and checks and decrypts
the attached ciphertext and tag using secret key ck in order to
recover the notification message m.
We note that the shard compression achieved through Bloom
filters is sacrificed in order to transmit the message m. However,
the subscriber-publisher privacy of Alice and Bob are maintained.
A rigorous proof of this would have to adapt the security definition
based on the IndNotExp experiment to provide the adversary with
the IDtA and ID
t
B identifiers for the target messages instead of
the raw keys ckA and ckB to preserve the secrecy of the message.
However, the rest of the proof and Security Theorem 1 do not need
major modification to show query privacy and message secrecy.
We note this scheme is in effect a leaky PIR scheme [34], based on
a secure anonymity infrastructure, and untrusted servers holding
shards. Given our evaluation results, relating the adversary advan-
tage to performance, such designs may be a competitive alternative
for other PIR related applications.
Broadcast AnNotify. The Security definitions and IndNotExp se-
curity game assumes that the adversary knows the notification key
used by a target subscriber. Yet, they are still unable to determine
whether they seek a specific notification. As a result, AnNotify can
be extended to support broadcast notifications to a group, without
difficulties.
In a broadcast scheme, the notifier distributes the secret notifica-
tion key amongst a group of subscribers. Access control is required
when publishing a notification to ensure it is genuine. This may
be achieved using any authentication or non-repudiation scheme,
since notifiers are not anonymous. All subscribers in the group
share that key, and query each epoch on the basis of it.
Due to the security guarantees of Security Theorem 1, even if
one of the subscribers in the group is corrupt – and shares the key
with the adversary – they are not able to break subscriber privacy
of another target user with greater advantage than the one-on-one
AnNotify design.
8 APPLICATIONS
Notification-onlyApplications.The first application is a privacy-
preserving version of event-notification services, such as the popu-
lar Yo application [36]. Yo and similar applications allow one user
to send a content-free notification to peer(s). In Yo, the receiving
applications notify the user by transmitting the word “Yo”, in text
and audio. Such event notification services can be used for social
purposes, as well as to provide simple information about events,
e.g., Yo was used to warn Israeli citizens of missile strikes [1].
As each message is only a single bit, applying Bloom filter is
ideal for this kind of communication. The Anonymous Yo server
will maintain a Bloom filter, and an anonymous Yo message will
be sent by turning on a few bits according to the shared keys. The
client side application will periodically retrieve the Bloom filter
and will prompt Yo from another client, if this client turned on the
relevant bits.
The second application is Anonymous Presence Services. The goal
of anonymous presence services is to allow users to indicate their
‘presence’, i.e., availability for online communication to their peers.
It is one of the functionalities usually provided by social networks
such as Skype and Facebook. A privacy-preserving presence pro-
tocol, providing presence indications to users while hiding their
relationships, was presented in [5]. Their solution relies on expen-
sive cryptography and is rather complex to implement, whereas
AnNotify provides an easier-to-implement and more efficient solu-
tion.
The third application is privacy-preserving blacklists, e.g., of
phishing domain names. The goal is to allow a relying party, e.g.,
a browser or email server, to check if a given domain name (or
other identifier) is ‘blacklisted’, without exposing the identity of
the domain being queried. In particular, all major browsers use
some ‘safe browsing’ blacklist to protect users from phishing and
malware websites. Google Safe Browsing (GSB) alone accounts
for a billion users to date [22]. To protect users privacy, clients do
not lookup the suspect URL or domain-name, instead the query is
for a cryptographic hash of the domain-name or URL. However,
as already observed [19], providers can still identify the query.
AnNotify provides an alternative which strongly protects privacy,
and with comparable overhead. We note that Bloom filters are
already widely used to improve efficiency of blacklists, e.g., see [18,
27].
In all applications, AnNotify allows preserving the privacy of
users, by hiding the relationships between users and the notifica-
tions they receive. The use of AnNotify is easy, and has insignificant
performance overhead in addition to the use of anonymous chan-
nels. However, notice that AnNotify exposes the total number of
clients currently connected to the system. We believe this is not a
concern in many applications. Indeed, many services publish an
estimate of the number of online clients, e.g., see Tor metrics [29].
Privacy-Preserving Caching and Storage Services. A classical
use for Bloom filters, is to improve the efficiency of caching and
storage mechanisms, by allowing efficient detection when cached
items were updated (or not). In particular, Bloom filters were used
to improve the efficiency of web-caches [6, 15].
AnNotify can similarly improve the efficiency of caching and
storage mechanisms, while also protecting privacy. This is espe-
cially important for privacy-preserving storage mechanisms such
as Oblivious RAM [21, 33] and PIR [8], where each access involves
significant overhead, hence avoiding unnecessary requests has a
large impact on performance.
Due to its high efficiency, AnNotify can also be used to improve
the privacy of web and DNS caches. In particular, web-users may
use AnNotify to improve the efficiency of anonymous-browsing
mechanisms such as Tor [29] and the use of AnNotify seems to
offer significant performance improvements compared to existing
proposals for protecting privacy of DNS users, see [16, 25, 32].
9 RELATEDWORK
Bloom Filters. Extensions of Bloom filters support additional fea-
tures, like deletion [4, 15, 30] or representing multisets [9]. In [2]
authors presented metrics as K-anonymity and γ−deniability to
measure the privacy and utility of Bloom filters but the resulting
privacy properties are weak. RAPPOR [14] allows the private collec-
tion of crowd sourced statistics as randomized responses in Bloom
filters, while guaranteeing ϵ-differential privacy. RAPPOR uses
input perturbation locally on the client side, however extracting
results requires sophisticated statistical techniques.
Anonymity. The most widely deployed anonymity system is Tor
[12]. In Tor, communications are routed through a network of relays
using onion routing, which hides the senders location and ensures
unlinkability between the user and the visited website. Although
Tor is popular it is vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks, and for
stronger anonymity properties mix networks have to be used [7, 10]
and as recent research showed, without sacrificing the latency [28].
Receiver anonymity systems, such as nymservers [26], may also be
used to route notifications to users. Pynchon Gate [31] proposes
a pseudonymous message retrieval system based on a distributed
PIR scheme.
Privacy in Remote Storage. Private information retrieval (PIR)
allows a client to retrieve privately a single record from a remote
public database. The naive solution retrieves all records from the
database, but PIR protocols are more efficient in terms of bandwidth
[8, 11, 20]. IT-PIR is a multiple server PIR variant, where each server
stores a replicated copy of the database. IT-PIR guarantees perfect
privacy, as long as one server is honest, but requires all servers
to process each query and operate on the whole database, which
increases both the computational and communication costs.
Toledo et al. [34] present variants of IT-PIR based schemes com-
posed with an anonymity systems, which reduce the computational
costs by allowing some information leakage. The key difference
between [34] and this work, is that AnNotify servers are entirely
untrusted and it wholly relies on an anonymity system for privacy.
Social applications require private presence notifications. Tradi-
tional implementations of presence give a central server the social
graph of users. Protocols like Apres [24] and DP5 [5] offer privacy-
preserving notification services. Apres splits the time into epochs
and hides the correlation between the connectivity of the clients in
every two epochs. DP5 offers stronger privacy guarantees, however
this design uses multi-server IT-PIR to look up other users presence
without revealing information about the social graph. We compare
this work with DP5 in our evaluation section.
The anonymous messaging system presented in Vuvuzela [35]
also introduces an auxiliary scheme for notifying users, that some-
one wants to contact them, by sending invitations. AnNotify has
a lower bandwidth and operational cost than Vuvuzela, since in
that scheme the users have to download and try to decrypt all the
invitations, including cover ones.
10 CONCLUSIONS
AnNotify provides efficient and private notifications in a scalable
manner, compared with previous approaches like DP5 [5] that
struggles to scale past 1million users. AnNotify benefits from amass
of users: its key security parameters depend on the number of shards
and anonymity set size of the underlying anonymity system. These
may be tuned to provide meaningful privacy protection despite
some leakage.
AnNotify lowers the quality of protection to achieve scalabil-
ity, but does so in a controlled and well understood manner: the
concrete security theorems presented indicate the advantage of the
adversary. The tighter bounds and empirical estimates of leakage
under repeated queries provide even stronger evidence that AnNo-
tify can provide strong protections. This is particularly relevant for
large-scale deployments and applications requiring notifications,
that today benefit from no protections at all.
Besides securing notifications, the AnNotify design, provides a
couple of important insights into general privacy engineering. We
show that anonymous channels may be important building blocks
to implement schemes, such as notifications, that are not entirely
related to messaging per se. Their study should expand to provide
robust and efficient schemes for such applications.
PIR schemes inspired from the AnNotify design and anonymous
channels, may be more competitive in terms of performance that
those proposed so far, despite leakage and required large anonymity
set. Pursuing this research direction would allow wider deployment
of private querying in general.
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A PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Security Theorem 1
Proof. To prove the main security theorem, and ultimately
show that AnNotify is∆-private, we need to show that the adversary
can only win the Indisitinguishable-Notification game, showed in
Figure 7 with an advantage ∆, defined in Definition 4.1, over a
random guess. We do so by first arguing that the adversary learns
nothing new7 from rounds not including the target subscriber, and
then computing the advantage given the information about the
rounds when the target subscriber was active.
We proceed through a sequence of hybrid games, with slight
modifications over the initial security Definition 4.1, including the
IndNotExp experiment (Game0). We first note that in the concrete
protocolsN .Notify andN .Query act on notification IDs generated
using a pseudo-random function (PRF) keyed with an unknown key
to the adversary and the epoch number (IDt = PRFck (t )). Thus,
7Remember that the adversary already is assumed to know the correspondence between
honest subscriber-publisher pairs, besides the target query in the challenge round.
procedure IndNotExp(N , A, n, S, κ, ∆, u)
(σ , l, π ) ← N .GenSystem(n, S, κ, ∆).
▷ Generate two challenge Publishers.
ckA ← N .GenChannel(π )
ckB ← N .GenChannel(π )
A (ckA, ckB, n, S, κ, ∆, π )
b
$← {0, 1}
ckT ← (if b = 0 then ckA else ckB )
▷ Generate all other Publishers & Subscribers.
for i = 0, . . . , n do
cki ← N .GenChannel(π )
end for
▷ Perform many rounds of the protocols.
for t = 0, . . . do
Ψt , Φt ← {}, { }
▷ Trigger some Publishers.
for i ∈ {0, . . . , n } ∪ {A, B } do
▷ Adv. chooses notifications.
if A (i, t, ‘notify?’) = 1 then
µi ← N .Notify(cki , t )
σ ← N .ProcNotify(µi , t, σ )
Ψt ← Ψt ∪ {(i, µi , σ ) }
end if
end for
▷ Adv. sees all notifications and server state.
A (t, Ψt )
▷ Trigger at least u honest Subscribers.
Qt ← {}
Ut ← A (t, u, ‘GetSubscribers?’)
Ut ← Ut ∩ {0, . . . , n }
if |Ut | < u then
return 0
end if
▷ Challenge the target Subscriber.
if A (t, ‘TargetQuery?’) = 1 then
Ut ← Ut ∩ {T }
end if
for all j ∈ Ut do
Qt ← Qt ∪ N .Query(ckj , t, π )
end for
for all ϕj ∈ Qt do
ρ j , σ ← N .ProcQuery(ϕj , t, σ )
Φt ← Φt ∪ {(ϕj , ρ j , σ ) }
end for
▷ Adv. sees all queries and server state.
A (t, Φt )
end for
return A (‘Guess?′) = b
end procedure
Figure 7: The Indistinguishable-Notification Experiment.
from the adversaries point of view, the IDs and the shards selection
look random and the adversary cannot learn the notification or
shard number of any other entity. Hence, we can replace all in-
stances of the first invocation of the PRF by true random functions
(Game1). Thus, the adversary can only distinguish between the
original experiment Game0 and Game1 with negligible advantage
due to the properties of secure PRFs.
In Game1 the information within each epoch not including the
target subscriber is statistically independent from the challenge b.
Based on this observation, we define Game2, that consists only of
rounds in which the target subscriber is activated to query. Thus,
the advantage of the adversary winning Game2 is equal to winning
Game1.
In each of the remaining rounds of Game2 the security defini-
tion dictates that a number u of honest users (including the target
subscriber), query for their sought notification and a dummy shard.
In Game2 the adversary can observe the IDt for all notifications
that have been seen in each epoch. However there remainu ′ queries
(u ≤ u ′ ≤ 2u) for which the adversary does not know the corre-
sponding IDt . These are indistinguishable from a random string,
and the corresponding queries are distributed uniformly among
the shards S . Thus, we define Game3 in which we simply remove
all notifications and queries for which the adversary knows the
IDt from all epochs – and that does not increase the adversary
advantage.
Following this, Game3 consists of epochs within which the un-
certainty of the adversary is whether notification A or notification
B was queried (depending on the challenge bit b), and the volumes
of at least u randomly distributed queries across all shards. Thus,
for every epoch, the adversary knowing the secret keys ckA, ckB
now has to decide on the basis of the query volumes XA and XB ob-
served in the shard sA, sB corresponding to µA and µB respectively,
what the challenge b was.
We compute the adversary advantage in Game3 directly. We
denote as SA, SB the events that the target user queried shards sA, sB
corresponding to notificationsA,B. Lemma 4.3 then shows that in a
single epoch given two known shards andu−1 queries to uniformly
random shards we can find ϵ,δ such that for notifications A and B
and all query volumes observed by the adversary: Pr[XA,XB |IA] ≤
eϵ Pr[XA,XB |IB ] with probability at least 1 − δ . Lemma 4.4 then
concludes the proof by showing this differentially private property
can be translated to a concrete adversary advantage ∆ gained by
observing many epochs. □
B PROOFS OF LEMMAS
B.1 Lemma 4.3 from Section 4.2
The proof is presented in the full version of the paper https://eprint.
iacr.org/2016/466
B.2 Lemma 4.4 from Section 4.2
The proof is presented in the full version of the paper https://eprint.
iacr.org/2016/466
